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Proposition 20
I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The California State Constitution requires that the State Legislature adjust the boundary lines of
districts once every ten years following the federal census for the State Assembly, State Senate,
State Board of Equalization, and California's congressional districts for the U.S. House of
Representatives (80 Assembly lines, 40 Senate lines, and 53 congressional lines). The boundaries
for these districts are adjusted to ensure each contains approximately the same number of people.
This process is called “redistricting.” The State Legislature then draws maps for each
congressional district.1
However, in 2008, California voters passed Proposition 11 which created the Citizens Redistricting
Commission (“Commission”). The Commission is charged with drawing maps for the various state
districts, starting in 2011. Proposition 11 also created a public process and implemented new
redistricting guidelines in order to militate against designing districts which favor a candidate or
political party.2
Proposition 20 – the topic of this review – extends the Commission’s responsibilities a step further.
Proposition 20 would take the boundary determination of California's congressional districts away
from the State Legislature and give it, instead, to the Commission.3 Specifically, Proposition 20
seeks to accomplish the following: (1) remove elected representatives from the process of
establishing congressional districts and transfer that authority to the recently authorized 14member Citizens Redistricting Commission; and (2) require any newly-proposed district lines to
be approved by nine of the fourteen commissioners including three democrats, three republicans,
and three from neither party.4
II.

EXISTING LAW
a.

Historical Background – Catalyst for the Creation of Proposition 20

Gerrymandering has long been a major concern in the creation of a fair and democratic election
process. It is, indeed, the major motivation for Proposition 20. Gerrymandering is the process of
dividing up geographic regions into voting districts in order to give an unfair advantage to one
party in elections or to hinder particular groups of constituents based on their political, racial,
linguistic, religion or class status. It takes the form of two different strategies. The first strategy is
packing, which concentrates as many voters of one political affiliation into a single district.5
1

Easy Voter Guide,http://lwvc.convio.net/site/PageServer?pagename=easyvoter_guide_propositions.
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3
California Secretary of the State, California Official Voter Information Guide, Proposition 20:
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Packing reduces the voters of a particular type or group representation in a single district while
denying them representation across districts.6 Conversely, it can be positively used to obtain
representation for a community of common interest which would otherwise dilute over several
districts so as to render them politically insignificant.7 The second strategy, often called cracking,
involves spreading like-minded voters apart across multiple districts to dilute their voting power in
each.8 Cracking denies voters of a particular type or group representation in multiple districts.9
Many believe that California’s current redistricting system feeds into the negative aspects of
gerrymandering. For example, one article, written by [insert name of person/institution who wrote
the article you got this information from] states that in California, the historically Democraticcontrolled Legislature has perpetually created oddly shaped district lines which throw Republican
incumbents together and carve out new districts that favor Democratic candidates.10 As evidence
of this, [name] points to the fact that Democrats, at times, are able to win a majority of California's
U.S. Congressional seats, despite earning less than a majority of the votes.11 In the same vein, one
Republican consultant commented on California's latest redistricting effort, believing the effort
unfairly protected incumbents of both parties. He states such redistricting arrangements “basically
[do] away with the need for elections.
The map below contains two districts which some have accused as being a product of
gerrymandering based on their distorted configuration.

6

Id.
Id.
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California's 11th Congressional District
b.

State Senate Districts in the Los Angeles area

Historical Background – Chronology of Events

Article XXI of the California Constitution requires that the legal process of redrawing the
boundaries of California's political districts be conducted through the legislative process.12 In
order to comply with the federal Voters Rights Act, the State Constitution requires that the state
adjust the boundary lines of districts once every ten years following the federal census for the State
Assembly, State Senate, State Board of Equalization, and California's congressional districts for
the U.S. House of Representatives.13 Redistricting legislation is introduced, moved through the
hearing process, passed out of the Legislature and sent to the Governor much like any other bill.14
In the past, district boundaries for all of the offices were determined in bills that became law after
they were approved by the Legislature and signed by the Governor, except when the Legislature
and Governor disagreed, in which case the California Supreme court performed the redistricting.15
In 1999, Republicans gathered enough signatures to propose a redistricting initiative that would
have put the state Supreme Court in control of redistricting.16 However, the Court found that the
initiative violated the California Constitution's single-subject law by including a raise in lobbyist
12

California State Senate, Elections and Reapportionment Committee,
http://www.sen.ca.gov/ftp/SEN/COMMITTEE/STANDING/EL/_home/Reapportionment/process.htp.
13
California Secretary of the State, Official Voter Information Guide, supra note 3.
14
California State Senate, Elections and Reapportionment Committee,
http://www.sen.ca.gov/ftp/SEN/COMMITTEE/STANDING/EL/_home/Reapportionment/process.htp.
15
California Secretary of the State, Official Voter Information Guide, supra note 3.
16
California’s Redistricting Information, http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/reports/remanual/ca.htm.
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fees.17 Other initiative efforts to reform redistricting were pursued, but did not collect enough
signatures to win a place on the ballot.18
In 2000, California boasted competitive elections in 9 out of 52 congressional districts.19 (A
competitive election is categorized as partisanship measures of 47% to 53%.)20 , However, in
2002, following the 2001 redistricting, California only had one competitive district.21
Furthermore, no incumbents were defeated in the 2002 elections, meaning that the only
competitive election was between non-incumbents who were not members of the Legislature
during the 2001 redistricting process.22
In the 2004 elections there was no change of political party in any of the district-elected offices at
either the State or Federal level and win by less than 55% of the vote was the exception to the rule.
Only five of 80 State Assembly districts, and two of 39 State Senate district seats realized a more
competitive race. Of the 53 U.S. Congressional seats, only three districts are less competitive than
the state districts and only three were won with less than 60% majority. Even in those races, no
party change occurred.
In 2006, a California constitutional amendment designed to encourage competitive districts was
presented to state Congress. This amendment garnered strong political support. For example,
Governor Schwarzenegger backed the constitutional amendment because he believed it would
restore competition to state politics.23 At a Capitol press conference, Schwarzenegger stated:
In the past three election periods, as we all know, only 4 out of 459 congressional
and legislative seats that were up for grabs in California have changed party
hands... To me that is evidence of a system that has become unresponsive and is
stuck in the status quo. We must bring competition back into the political
process.24
Other supporters of the amendment declared that incumbents have a conflict of interest because
their chief goal is buttressing their chances for re-election.25 Former Assembly member Fred
Keeley proclaimed that the system permitting legislators to draw their own districts was
“essentially an incumbent protection program.”26 Despite the strong political backing of the
17

Id.
Id.
19
Redistricting and Incumbent Protection in 2001-2002, http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=715.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Greg Lucas, Governor Proposes a Citizen Panel for Redistricting, San Francisco Chronicle, December
6, 2006, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/12/06/BAG2IMQA4N1.DTL&hw=redistricting&sn=001&sc=1000.
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amendment, the issue was killed for the 2006 electoral cycle because State legislators claimed it
was turned in late, leaving some observers to question whether the death of the bill was
accidental.27
Finally, critics of the redistricting process attributed California's 2008 Budget impasse, which
extended 76 days beyond the deadline, as a negative consequence of the districting scheme.28
These critics asserted that the high turnover of legislators, due to term limits, combined with "safe"
districts makes it more likely that "hard liners" will be elected. Accordingly, these critics allege,
the legislators will lack experience in dealing across party lines in a collegial manner, creating a
complete lack of senior leadership capable of building and enforcing cross-party compromise.29
c.

Proposition 11

In November 2008, voters passed Proposition 11, which created the Citizens Redistricting
Commission to establish new district boundaries for the State Assembly, State Senate, and the
State Board of Equalization beginning after the 2010 Census.30 The commission consists of 14
members – 5 democrats, 5 republicans, and 4 non-affiliated members.31 Proposition 11 left in
place the Legislature’s power to draw the state’s congressional districts, but established new
redistricting criteria for the Legislature to follow when redrawing congressional district lines.32 As
amended by Proposition 11 in 2008, Article 21 now requires the Legislature to create a
congressional redistricting plan that meets the following criteria: (1) The population of all
congressional districts shall be reasonably equal; (2) districts shall comply with the federal Voting
Rights Act; (3) districts shall be geographically contiguous; (4) the geographic integrity of any
city, county, neighborhood, or community of interest shall be respected to the extent possible
without violating the requirements of any of the preceding subdivisions. Communities of interest
shall not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates; (5) to the
extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria above, districts shall be drawn
to encourage geographical compactness such that nearby areas of population are not bypassed for
more distant population.33 The criteria included in Article 21 are theoretically enforceable by
courts, and in the past efforts to challenge redistricting plans for violating previous versions of
redistricting criteria in the Constitution have been attempted. But, as the plaintiffs in Nadler v.

27

Sign On San Diego, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060819/news_lz1ed19middle.html.
Jennifer Steinhauer, California Embroiled in a Battle Over the Budget, New York Times, August 14,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/15/us/15calif.html.
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Politics of California, Contra Costa Times, July 26, 2009, section AA, page 1 available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_California#cite_note-2.
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California Secretary of the State, Official Voter Information Guide, supra note 3.
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Rose Institute of State and Local Government, The Weakness of California’s Congressional
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Schwarzenegger, 137 Cal. App. 4th 1327 (3rd Dist. 2006) learned the hard way, California courts
historically adopt a deferential stance toward redistricting plans drawn by the Legislature.
In Nadler, a case that involved redistricting before the adoption of Proposition 11, the California
Court of Appeals for the Third District found that the “provision for geographic integrity . . . is the
most flexible of the reapportionment standards and provides the greatest discretion to our State
Legislature.” More broadly, “a reapportionment plan enacted by the “[L]egislature and approved
by the Governor is entitled to significant judicial deference. Such a plan is presumptively
constitutional…”34 Given the hierarchy of the standards and the difficulty of deciphering the
motivations behind the drawing of legislative district lines, the Nadler Court adopted a deferential
stance, stating “petitioners have the burden of proving that the redistricting plans are
unconstitutional. There is no merit to the petitioner’s contentions that once they have made a
certain showing of a lack of contiguity or a lack of geographic integrity, the burden shifts to
respondents to justify the plan.”35 Petitioners must also show that the Legislature acted “arbitrarily
and capriciously” in violating these requirements.36 Courts “must defer to the Legislature’s
determination [that facts exist to support legislation] unless it is palpably arbitrary. Consequently
we must uphold the challenged legislation so long as the Legislature could have rationally
determined a set of facts that support it.”37
The selection of the members of the commission permits any registered California voter to apply.38
Once the applications are received, the State Auditor, along with a newly created Applicant
Review Panel of three independent auditors, screen them for qualifications and conflicts of
interest.39 Applicants' qualifications will be screened based on their analytical skill, impartiality,
and appreciation of California's diversity.40 Applicants will be removed from the process if they,
or an immediate relative of theirs, has (1) been a political candidate for state or federal office; (2)
been a lobbyist; (3) contributed $2,000 or more in any year to a political candidate; or (4) changed
their political party affiliation in the past five years.41 Additionally, applicants must have voted in
at least two of the last three general elections.42 Upon completing the screening process, the Panel
selects 60 recommended applicants.43

34

Nadler v. Schwarzenegger, 137 Cal. App. 4th 1327 (3rd Dist. 2006).
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Id. (quoting Schabarum v. California Legislature, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1205, 1220 (3rd Dist. 1998)).
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On September 23, 2010, the Panel selected its pool of 60 finalists; consisting of 20 democrats, 20
republicans, and 20 “others.”44 The group of applicants is diverse ethnically, consisting of 20
(33%) White, 17 (28%) Hispanic or Latino, 10 (17%) Asian, 8 (13%) Black, 4 (7%) American
Indian or Alaskan Native, and 1 (2%) is Pacific Islander.45 Additionally, the applicants represent a
wide range of economic status, with one applicant reported earning less than $35,000 last year, 9
earning between $35,000 and $75,000, 20 earning between $75,000 and $125,000, 22 earning
between $125,000 and $250,000, and 8 earning more than $250,000.46 The graph below depicts
more details of the distribution of the 60 finalists.

Amongst the 60 finalists, the majority and minority party leaders of the Assembly and Senate may
strike up to 24 applicants from the pool.47 Following the striking of, the State Auditor randomly
draws eight names that then become part of the Commission.48 The eight members appoint the
final six members from the applicants left in the pool to round out the 14-member Commission.49
The redistricting plan must be approved by nine members of the 14-member Commission,
requiring three affirmative votes from each political group represented.50
To comply with federal law and other requirements, the Commission must not favor or
discriminate against political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.51 Additionally, the
44

Rose Institute of State and Local Government, updated: California’s 60 Finalists for Redistricting
Commission a diverse group, http://rosereport.org/20100923/californians-60-finalists-for-redistrictingcommission-a-diverse-group/.
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commission is required, to the extent possible, to adopt district boundaries that (1) maintain the
geographic integrity of any city, county, neighborhood, and “community of interest” in a single
district; (2) develop geographically compact districts; (3) place two assembly districts together
within one Senate district and place ten Senate districts together within one State Board of
Equalization district.52 Notably, Proposition 11 did not define the term “communities of interest.”53
In developing a redistricting plan, the Commission is required to hold public hearings and allow
for public comment on proposed redistricting plans developed by the Commission.54 The
redistricting plan is subject to voter approval under the state’s referendum process.55 Additionally,
registered voters can challenge the constitutionality of a redistricting plan before the state Supreme
Court.56 Upon approval, the redistricting plan is implemented for the next decade.57 The process
repeats every 10 years, with a new 14-member commission for each future redistricting.58
While Proposition 11 allocated redistricting duties to the Commission with regards to State
Assembly, State Senate, and the State Board of Equalization, it did not allocate redistricting duties
in regards to Congressional districts. But, Proposition 11 made some changes to the requirement
that the Legislature must meet in drawing congressional districts, requiring them to attempt to
draw geographically compact districts and maintain geographic integrity of localities,
neighborhoods, and communities of interest.59 Additionally, Proposition 11 requires the
Legislature to provide public access to data and maps used in the redistricting process, and solicit
public comment on its proposals.60 Essentially, Proposition 11 requires the State Legislature to
apply the same criteria used by the Commission when drawing district lines.61 However,
Proposition 11 does not prohibit the Legislature from favoring or discriminating against political
parties, incumbents, or political candidates when drawing congressional districts.62
III.

CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW

Proposition 20 amends the California Constitution to change the redistricting process for
California's districts in the U.S. House of Representatives, removing the authority for
congressional redistricting from the Legislature and giving the authority to the Citizen's

52
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Redistricting Commission.63 This would allow the Commission to draw the district lines for
California's 53 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. The commission would be charged
with drawing congressional districts in compliance with federal law, and the requirements of
Proposition 11 pertaining to favoring or discriminating against political parties, incumbents, or
political candidates, considering geographic integrity of cities, counties, neighborhoods, and
communities of interest.64
IV.

FISCAL IMPACT

In 2001, the Legislature spent approximately $3 million for redistricting activities.65 In 2009,
under the Proposition 11 process, the Legislature approved $3 million from the State's General
Fund for redistricting activities related to the 2010 census along with approximately $3 million
from another state fund to support the application and selection process for commission
members.66 Proposition 11 specified that each decade the Legislature must provide a three-year
appropriation for the Commission totaling the greater of (i) $3 million or (ii) the amount
appropriated in the previous redistricting cycle (adjusted for inflation).67 These funds would be
used to establish the application review process, communicate with the public, compensate
commissioners, and employ legal and other experts in the field of redistricting.68 Commission
members would be compensated at a rate of $300 per day, plus out of pocket expenses.69 The
Legislative Analyst’s Office estimates that the minimum amount required for 2010 would be about
$4 million (the 2001 amount spent on redistricting adjusted for estimated inflation through 2010).70
Under Proposition 20, the Commission would experience increased costs from handling
congressional redistricting activities; however, this would be offset by a reduction in the
Legislature's redistricting costs.71 Any net change in future redistricting costs under this measure
probably would not be significant.72
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
a.

Conflicting Measures

While Proposition 20 was placed on the ballot in order to expand the redistricting responsibilities
of the Citizen's Redistricting Commission to include congressional districts, Proposition 27 intends
63
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to abolish the Commission altogether.73 Therefore, Proposition 20 and Proposition 27 are in direct
conflict. The California Constitution states, “If provisions of two or more measures approved at
the same election conflict, those of the measure receiving the highest affirmative vote shall
prevail.”74 In the event that both Proposition 20 and Proposition 27 are approved, the one
receiving the highest number of votes will be enacted, notwithstanding legal challenges.75
b.

Constitutional Challenges under the Voting Rights Act and the 14th
Amendment

The United States Supreme Court has ruled, based on the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, that the states are required to reconstruct the boundary lines of the
Congressional, State Legislative and other districts after the year in which the national decennial
census is conducted in order to ensure that the population of each district of a given kind is
reasonably equal.76 If one believes that a legislative district is in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it is a product of gerrymandering, that person must
prove both discriminatory intent and that the apportionment plan has an actual discriminatory
effect on an identifiable political group.77 Additionally, the discriminatory effect of a districting
scheme must be presently demonstrable, not speculative or of a type that will only become
apparent in the future.78
Conduct showing the intent to gerrymander districts for the purpose of minimization of the voting
strength of a particular group is unlikely to be proven by direct or specific evidence, but rather by
inferences based on particular circumstances.79 The inferences generally must be proven by the
totality of the circumstances.80 For example, evidence that African Americans constitute a
supermajority in one congressional district while amounting to less than a plurality in a
neighboring district will not, by itself, suffice to prove that a jurisdiction was motivated by race in
drawing its district lines. However, this would violate the Equal Protection Clause when the
evidence also shows a high correlation between race and party preference.81 In another example, a
claim that Hispanic influence would be impermissibly diluted was insufficient to block
73

California Propositions, Proposition 27: Financial Accountability in Redistricting Act,
http://www/californiaproposition.org/prop_27_2010.
74
Cal. Const. art. II, § 10(b).
75
California Secretary of the State, Official Voter Information Guide, supra note 3.
76
California State Senate, Elections and Reapportionment Committee,
http://www.sen.ca.gov/ftp/SEN/COMMITTEE/STANDING/EL/_home/Reapportionment/process.htp.
77
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redistricting that moved some Hispanic voters into another district that already had Hispanic voting
majority. However, the claim would have been viable if Hispanics were a majority in the district
losing Hispanic voters, or evidence showed that Hispanic voters were able to elect candidates by
forming coalitions with other minority groups, or where a history of white crossover voting
showed possibility that Hispanics could elect candidate of their choice.82 Furthermore, a mere
showing that a political or racial group is not represented in a legislature in proportion to its
numbers is insufficient to support a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution, since no racial or
political group has a constitutional right to be represented in a legislature in proportion to its
numbers.83 Rather, the key inquiry is whether the minority group's members have been hindered
in their attempts to participate in the political process.84
In regard to irregularly shaped legislative districts, courts have held that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require regularity of shape in legislative districts.85 But, districts that look
like “a bug splattered on a windshield, a Rorschach ink-blot test, a jigsaw puzzle, or a sacred
Mayan Bird,” or are so irregular in shape on their face that they can be understood only as an effort
to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, are products of presumptively
unconstitutional racial gerrymandering subject to strict scrutiny.86 One such example of irregular
districts is found in Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine. In Bone Shirt, the court ruled that the 2001 legislative
redistricting plan violates Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and that State officials must get
federal approval under the Act before implementing a new legislative redistricting plan in a district
that includes two Indian reservations.
VI.

PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
a.

Proponents

Proponents of Proposition 20 assert that it will accomplish the following desired goals: (1) create
fair congressional districts; (2) make congressional representatives more accountable and
responsive to voters; and (3) make it easier to vote out members of Congress.87
Proponents claim that its passage would empower voters by making it easier for them to vote
politicians out of office.88 In turn, the proponents believe, it will be easier to hold politicians
accountable.89 Proposition 20 would do this by giving the Citizens Redistricting Commission the
82

Ariz. Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 366 F. Supp. 2d
887 (D. Ariz. 2005).
83
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power to draw election districts for members of Congress, as opposed to politicians in
Sacramento.90
In its current format, proponents believe that allowing California state politicians the ability to
draw congressional districts ensures that they will get their political friends and allies reelected
into Congress.91 As a result, proponents suggest that there is little incentive for politicians to
respond to their constituents.92 The proponents cite the Los Angeles Times and Orange County
Register as revealing that 32 Members of Congress and other politicians paid political consultants
over $1 million to draw district boundaries to guarantee their reelection in the last redistricting.93
In response, according to the proponents, politicians and their consultants drew bizarrely-shaped
districts, dividing up cities and communities, thereby stifling the power of voters.94 Proponents
contend that Proposition 20’s passage will ensure that the congressional redistricting process is
completely open to the public and transparent, whereas in the past redistricting was conducted
behind closed doors amongst the politicians themselves.
Proponents contend that even though the California Constitution sets guidelines for redistricting,
the Legislature has redrawn districts to the advantage of whatever party is in power and also
protects incumbents.95 As a result, proponents’ state, legislative and congressional district lines
too often are sprawled out over huge, unrelated regions that needlessly cross county and city
boundaries.96 They further opine that time and again "safe" districts have been drawn for
incumbents and to maximize election victories for those in the dominant political party.97
Proponents find t is a simple matter of fairness and voter service to have bipartisan commissioners,
who do not have a personal stake in the outcome of elections, to draw all district lines for
legislative and congressional districts.98
b.

Opponents

The League of Women Voters (“LWV”) do not support Proposition 20 in the upcoming November
elections.99 LWV in theory supports Proposition 20, which would extend the independent
commission’s power to draw Congressional district lines.100 But, for these opponents, problems
are tucked into the proposed law.
90
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LWV asserts that Proposition 20 would reduce the amount of time the commission has to do its
work while adding to the amount of work they do, and it would narrow the definition of
communities of interest in ways that would make it harder for the commission to protect
California’s diverse neighborhoods.101 Definitions of communities of interest are always open to
varying interpretations and subject to lengthy adjudication in the legal system.102 However, LW
suggests that the new definition in Proposition 20 could restrict the commission’s choices, for
example, by making it difficult to see how a community made up of the various Asian and Latino
populations in the San Gabriel Valley—multiracial, multilingual, and with wide disparities in
income level, education, employment, and political awareness—could easily fit the proposed
definition.103 As another example, a community of diverse racial, ethnic, social, economic, and
educational components that organized around an environmental issue such as pollution from a
port or an industrial brown field could also encounter challenges as to whether it fit the narrowed
definition.104 This is the first time the commission will do this work, and LWV proposes to give
the commission a chance to make redistricting reform work before implementing Proposition
20.105
Further arguments in opposition to Proposition 20 are that it wastes taxpayer dollars and it turns
back the clock on redistricting law.106 Opponents argue that Proposition 20 is a disaster that must
be defeated. These opponents include Daniel H. Lowenstein (Founding Chairman of California
Fair Political Practices Commission), Aubry L. Stone (President of the California Black Chamber
of Commerce), and Carl Pope (Chairman of the Sierra Club).107 Their criticisms are directed
toward Charles Munger, Jr. who is the sole bank-roller of Proposition 20. They argue that just for
the Proposition’s qualification, Munger gave $3.3 million, a figure that will probably multiply
many times by Election Day,108 and, if Proposition 20 passes, the taxpayers will shoulder this
amount instead of Munger Jr. .109 These opponents argue that Proposition 20’s rival, Proposition
27, is a better choice for California taxpayers.
Opponents in favor of Proposition 27 state, first, non–partisan experts have concluded that voting
yes on Proposition 27 will save taxpayer dollars.110 These experts claim that a “Summary of
estimate by Legislative Analyst and Director of Finance of fiscal impact on state and local
government report that a yes on Proposition 27 will likely decrease in-state redistricting costs
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totaling several million dollars every ten years.”111 Second, Proposition 20 adds to the cascade of
waste that Proposition 27 would avoid, i.e.,112 Governor Schwarzenegger has already proposed
doubling the redistricting budget and spending millions more dollars to draw lines for politicians
while the state is facing a $19 billion deficit.113
Beyond being a waste of taxpayer dollars, these opponents argue that Proposition 20 mandates
“Jim Crow” economic districts.114 They argue that Proposition 20 turns back the clock on
redistricting law, and inexplicably, mandates that all districts (including Assembly, Senate, and
Congress) must be segregated by income level.115 Proposition 20 mandates that all districts be
segregated according to similar living standards and that districts include only people with similar
work opportunities.116
c.

Political Indecision

As explained earlier, gerrymandering is generally the political strategy employed by the party in
power at a particular time in order to maintain their power and assure their incumbents are
reelected. Therefore, Democrats and Republicans have both been accused of gerrymandering
tactics in the past and both parties support or oppose particular changes to the redistricting process
based on political opportunism. This fact is particularly evident given the contrast of party support
in California when compared to Florida.
In Florida, Republicans hold two-thirds of legislative and congressional seats due to creative
redistricting in 2001. Citizens in Florida will have the opportunity to approve of Amendments 5
and 6, which will set standards the Legislature must follow when drawing the district lines. These
standards will give those who wish to challenge a redistricting plan a legal mode of relief, while at
the same time, presumably, deterring the Legislature from enacting a heavily partisan
gerrymander.117
The notable distinction between California and Florida, in this circumstance, is that the Democratic
Party supports the efforts to inhibit gerrymandering in Florida, while vigorously opposing
Proposition 20 in California.118 At the same time, Republicans also oppose Proposition 20 in
California and Florida. The reason that Republicans and Democrats both oppose Proposition 20
(and support Proposition 27) in California is the result of a compromise struck between the two
parties during the last round of redistricting in 2001. At that time, the incumbents in both parties
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agreed to draw district lines that would ensure they would be reelected for years to come. This has
proven to be a savvy political move by both parties, as an incumbent has only lost in an election on
4 occasions in the last 9 years. Considering there are 60 members combined in the State Senate
and Assembly who face reelection every two and four years, respectively, 4 incumbent defeats is a
relatively low number. This further propagates the view that gerrymandering is prevalent in
California politics.
d.

Changes in the Makeup of California

California's demographics have shifted dramatically since the last redistricting process in 2001.
Such change is likely to cause concern for legislators seeking to assure their own reelection,
especially if the redistricting process is no longer in their hands. From 2000 to 2010, the
population in California has undergone a major shift eastward, with people moving to California's
inland areas from its coastal enclaves.119 This means that California's congressional district
boundaries will certainly undergo major upheaval after the 2010 census.120 As one example, the
San Francisco bay area grew less than 1% since the last redistricting, while the central valley area
has grown by 21%. Los Angeles County has grown 5%, while San Diego, Orange, Riverside, San
Bernardino and Imperial Counties have grown by 17%.121 The manner in which the districts are
drawn according to California's current makeup, as well as its anticipated future makeup, will
clearly affect the outcome of future elections.
VII.

CONCLUSION

If California voters pass Proposition 20, the Citizens Redistricting Commission will assume
control of the redistricting authority of California's Congressional Districts. The Commission,
which consists of 14 members (5 democrats, 5 republicans, and 4 non-affiliated members), already
controls the redistricting authority of the State Assembly, the State Senate, and the Board of
Equalization based on the power allocated to it by Proposition 11 in 2008. The Commission would
need approval from at least 9 members (at least 3 from the Democratic members, Republican
members, and non-affiliated members) in order for the district maps to be adopted.
If Proposition 20 fails, the Commission will only control the redistricting authority of the State
Assembly, the State Senate, and the Board of Equalization. The redistricting authority of
Congressional Districts will remain with the California Legislature. If Proposition 20 and 27 both
pass, the proposition with the most affirmative votes will go into action and the proposition with
the least affirmative votes will be negated.
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